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Ontology is the branch of philosophy that studies concepts such as existence, being, becoming, and reality. It includes the questions of how entities are grouped into basic categories and which of these entities exist on the most fundamental level. Ontology is sometimes referred to as the science of being and belongs to the major branch of philosophy known as metaphysics.
Ontologists often try to determine what the categories or highest kinds are and how they form a system of categories that provides an encompassing classification of all entities. Commonly proposed categories include substances, properties, relations, states of affairs and events. These categories are characterized by fundamental ontological concepts, like particularity and universality, abstractness and concreteness, or possibility and necessity. Of special interest is the concept of ontological dependence, which determines whether the entities of a category exist on the most fundamental level. Disagreements within ontology are often about whether entities belonging to a certain category exist and, if so, how they are related to other entities.[1]
When used as a countable noun, the terms "ontology" and "ontologies" refer not to the science of being but to theories within the science of being. Ontological theories can be divided into various types according to their theoretical commitments. Monocategorical ontologies hold that there is only one basic category, which is rejected by polycategorical ontologies. Hierarchical ontologies assert that some entities exist on a more fundamental level and that other entities depend on them. Flat ontologies, on the other hand, deny such a privileged status to any entity.
Etymology[edit source]
The compound word ontology ('study of being') combines
- onto- (Greek: ὄν, on;[note 1] gen. ὄντος, ontos, 'being' or 'that which is') and
- -logia (-λογία, 'logical discourse').[2][3]
While the etymology is Greek, the oldest extant records of the word itself is a New Latin form ontologia, which appeared
- in 1606 in the Ogdoas Scholastica by Jacob Lorhard (Lorhardus), and
- in 1613 in the Lexicon philosophicum by Rudolf Göckel (Goclenius).
The first occurrence in English of ontology, as recorded by the Oxford English Dictionary,[4] came in 1664 through Archelogia philosophica nova... by Gideon Harvey[5] The word was first used, in its Latin form, by philosophers, and based on the Latin roots (and in turn on the Greek ones).
Overview[edit source]
Ontology is closely associated with Aristotle's question of 'being qua being': the question of what all entities in the widest sense have in common.[6][7] The Eleatic principle is one answer to this question: it states that being is inextricably tied to causation, that "Power is the mark of Being".[6] One problem with this answer is that it excludes abstract objects. Another explicit but little accepted answer can be found in Berkeley's slogan that "to be is to be perceived".[8] Intimately related but not identical to the question of 'being qua being' is the problem of categories.[6] Categories are usually seen as the highest kinds or genera.[9] A system of categories provides a classification of entities that is exclusive and exhaustive: every entity belongs to exactly one category. Various such classifications have been proposed, they often include categories for substances, properties, relations, states of affairs or events.[6][10] At the core of the differentiation between categories are various fundamental ontological concepts and distinctions, for example, the concepts of particularity and universality, of abstractness and concreteness, of ontological dependence, of identity and of modality.[6][10] These concepts are sometimes treated as categories themselves, are used to explain the difference between categories or play other central roles for characterizing different ontological theories. Within ontology, there is a lack of general consensus concerning how the different categories are to be defined.[9] Different ontologists often disagree on whether a certain category has any members at all or whether a given category is fundamental.[10]
Particulars and universals[edit source]
Particulars or individuals are usually contrasted with universals.[11][12] Universals concern features that can be exemplified by various different particulars.[13] For example, a tomato and a strawberry are two particulars that exemplify the universal redness. Universals can be present at various distinct locations in space at the same time while particulars are restricted to one location at a time. Furthermore, universals can be fully present at different times, which is why they are sometimes referred to as repeatables in contrast to non-repeatable particulars.[10] The so-called problem of universals is the problem to explain how different things can agree in their features, e.g. how a tomato and a strawberry can both be red.[6][13] Realists about universals believe that there are universals. They can solve the problem of universals by explaining the commonality through a universal shared by both entities.[10] Realists are divided among themselves as to whether universals can exist independently of being exemplified by something ("ante res") or not ("in rebus").[14] Nominalists, on the other hand, deny that there are universals. They have to resort to other notions to explain how a feature can be common to several entities, for example, by positing either fundamental resemblance-relations between the entities (resemblance nominalism) or a shared membership to a common natural class (class nominalism).[10]
Abstract and concrete[edit source]
Many philosophers agree that there is an exclusive and exhaustive distinction between concrete objects and abstract objects.[10] Some philosophers consider this to be the most general division of being.[15] Examples of concrete objects include plants, human beings and planets while things like numbers, sets and propositions are abstract objects.[16] But despite the general agreement concerning the paradigm cases, there is less consensus as to what the characteristic marks of concreteness and abstractness are. Popular suggestions include defining the distinction in term
Rudolph Goclenius the Elder (Latin: Rudolphus Goclenius; born Rudolf Gockel or Göckel; 1 March 1547 – 8 June 1628) was a German scholastic philosopher. Gockel is often credited with coining the term "psychology" in 1590, though the term had been used by Marko Marulić at least 66 years earlier.[1] Gockel had extensive backing, and made significant contributions to the field of ontology. He extended the development of many ideas from Aristotle. Several of Gockel's ideas were published and built upon by later philosophers.
Works[edit source]
In his "Philosophical Inquiries", published in 1599, Goclenius provides a synoptic table that subdivides the philosophical doctrines, or liberal arts, into special domains of knowledge.[24] It is useful for the classification of his works to a certain point. He used the term ontology in his Lexicon philosophicum (1613) which was coined by Jacob Lorhard in his Ogdoas Scholastica (1606).
Psychology[edit source]
Goclenius’ major contributions also included publications which led to the term psychology. In two academic disputations presided by Goclenius at Marburg University in 1586 the word "psychology" appears as an adjective ("psychologicae").[25] His anthology Psychologia: hoc est, de hominis perfectione, animo, et in primis ortu hujus published in 1590 is the first book to contain the word "psychology" in the title.[26] The Psychologia of 1590 (a second printing was issued in 1594) contains mostly excerpts from treatises written between 1579 and 1589.[27] The book's full title translates to English as, "Psychology: that is, on the perfection of man, his mind, and especially its origin, the comments and discussions of certain theologians & philosophers of our time who are shown on the turned page." Here, the term psychology refers to both a subject of inquiry ("the perfection of man, his mind, and especially its origin") and the inquiry itself ("the comments and discussions of certain theologians & philosophers of our time"). In the 17th century, Goclenius' Psychologia was read and quoted by scholars like Robert Burton,[28] Daniel Sennert[29] and Jakob Thomasius.[30] Goclenius himself returned to his Psychologia in a textbook on natural science of 1604[31] and in some philosophical disputations.[32]
Logic[edit source]
Goclenius' crowning achievement is his original contribution made to term logic, called the Goclenian Sorites.[33] In the words of the British logician Carveth Read:
An example for the use of sorites in an argumentative context is presented by Goclenius in his "Dissertatio De Ortu Animi" which concludes the first edition of the Psychologia.[35]
Contrary to Carveth Read's assessment, however, Dr. Rudolph Goclenius did not invent the Goclenian Sorites: St. Thomas Aquinas did:
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