75 περὶ σχήματος ἢ χρώματος εἶπες ὅτι ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ μανθάνω 
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ἐπὶ πᾶσι τούτοις ταῦτόν ; ἢ οὐδὲ ἐπὶ τούτοις, ὦ Μένων, 
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γύλῳ καὶ εὐθεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἃ δὴ σχήματα καλεῖς, 
ταὐτὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσι; πειρῶ εἰπεῖν, ἵνα καὶ γένηταί σοι 
μελέτη πρὸς τὴν περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀπόκρισιν. 
Β ΜΕΝ. Μή, ἀλλὰ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπέ. 
QO. Βούλει σοι χαρίσωμαι; 
ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε. 
TQ. ᾿Εθελήσεις οὖν καὶ σὺ ἐμοὶ εἰπεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ; 
ΜΕΝ. Ἔγωγε. 
ΣΩ. ἹΙροθυμητέο: τοίνυν" ἄξιον γάρ. 
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τί ἂν οἴει σοι ἀποκεκρίσθαι ; 

SOCRATES: 

When you speak like that, do you assert that

 the round is no more round

 than it is straight,

 and that the straight

 is no more straight

 than it is round?

 MENO: 

Certainly not, Socrates.

 SOCRATES: 

Yet you say that the round is no more

 a shape than 

the straight is,

 nor the one 

more than the other.

 - That is true. 

SOCRATES:

 What then is this to which the name shape applies?

 Try to tell me. 

If then you answered the man who was questioning about 

75 

shape or color: 

"I do not understand what you want, my man, nor what you mean,"

 he would probably wonder

 and say: "You do not understand that I am

 seeking that which is the same

 in all these cases?"

 Would you still have nothing to say,

 Meno, if 

one asked you:

 "What is this which applies to the round

 and the straight

 and the other things

 which you call shapes

 and which is the same

 in them all?"

 Try to say,

 that you may practice 

for your answer 

about virtue. b

 MENO: 

No, Socrates, but you tell me. 

SOCRATES: 

Do you want me to do you this favor? 

MENO: 

I certainly do. 

SOCRATES: 

And you will then be willing to tell me about virtue?

 MENO:

 I will.

 SOCRATES: 

We must certainly press on. The subject is worth it. 

MENO: 

It surely is. 

SOCRATES: 

Come then, 

let us try 

to tell you

 what shape is.

 See whether you

 will accept

 that it is this:

 Let us say that shape is

 that which 

alone of 

existing things

 always follows

 color.

 Is that satisfactory c to you, or do you look for it in some other way?

 I should be satisfied if you defined virtue in this way.

 MENO: 

But that is foolish, Socrates. 

SOCRATES: 

How do you mean? 

MENO: 

That shape, you say, always follows color. 

Well then, if someone were to say that he did not know what color is,

 but that he had the same difficulty as he had about shape,

 what do you think your answer would be?

 SOCRATES:

 A true one, surely, 

and if my questioner was 

one of those clever and disputatious debaters, 

I would say to him:

 "I have given my answer; if it is wrong, it is your job to refute it." 

But if they

 are friends d as you and I are,

 and want to discuss with each other,

 they must answer

in a manner more gentle

 and more proper to discussion.

 By this I mean that the answers must

 not only be true,

 but in terms admittedly

 known to the questioner.

 I too will try to speak in these terms.

 Do you call something "the end"? 

I mean such a thing as

 a limit or boundary,

 for e all those are,

 I say,

 the same thing.

 Prodicus1 might disagree with us, 

but you surely call

 something "finished" or "completed"

 -that

 is what I want to express, 

nothing elaborate.

 MENO: 

I do,

 and I think

 I understand 

what you mean. 

SOCRATES: 

Further, you call something a plane,

 and something else 76 a solid, 

as in geometry?

 MENO: 

I do. 

SOCRATES: 

From this you may understand

 what I mean by shape,

 for I say this

 of every shape,

 that a shape

 is that

 which limits

 a solid; 

in a word, 

a shape

 is the limit

 of a solid.

 MENO: 

And what do you say color is, Socrates? 

SOCRATES: 

You are outrageous, Meno. 

You bother an old man to answer questions, 

but you yourself are not willing to recall

 and to tell b me what Gorgias says that virtue is.

 MENO: 

After you have answered this, Socrates, I will tell you.

 SOCRATES: 

Even someone who was blindfolded would know from your conversation that you are handsome and still have lovers. 

MENO: 

Why so? 

SOCRATES: 

Because you are forever giving orders in a discussion, 

as spoiled people do,

 who behave like tyrants

 as long as they are young. 

And perhaps you have recognized

 that I am at a disadvantage

 with c handsome people,

 so I will do you the favor

 of an answer.

 MENO: 

By all means do me that favor. 

SOCRATES: 

Do you want me to answer after the manner of Gorgias,

 which you would most easily follow?

 MENO: 

Of course I want that. 

SOCRATES:

 Do you both say there are effluvia of things, 

as Empedocles2 does? 

-

 Certainly.

 1. 'Prodicus was a well-known Sophist who was especially keen on the exact meaning of words. 2. Empedocles (c. 493-433 B.C.) of Acragas in Sicily was a philosopher famous for his theories about the world of nature and natural phenomena (including sense-perception).

SOCRATES: 

And that there are channels

 through which

 the effluvia

 make their way? -

 Definitely. 

d SOCRATES:

 And some effluvia fit some of the channels,

 while others 

are too small or too big? 

- That is so. 

SOCRATES:

 And there is something which you call sight? 

- There is. 

SOCRATES: 

From this,

 "comprehend what I state," 

as Pindar said;3

 for color is an effluvium

 from shapes which

 fits the sight

 and is perceived. 

MENO: 

That seems to me to be an excellent answer, Socrates. 

SOCRATES: 

Perhaps it was given in the manner

 to which you are accustomed. 

At the same time 

I think that you can deduce

 from this e answer 

what sound is, 

and smell, 

and many such things.

 - Quite so. 

SOCRATES:

 It is a theatrical answer so it pleases you, Meno,

 more than that about shape.

 - It does. 

SOCRATES: 

It is not better, son of Alexidemus,

 but I am convinced that the other is, 

and I think you would agree,

 if you did not have to

 go away before the mysteries 

as you told me yesterday,

 but could remain and be initiated. 

MENO:

 I would stay, Socrates, 

if you could tell me many things 77 like these.

 SOCRATES:

 I shall certainly not be lacking in eagerness

 to tell you such things,

 both for your sake and my own,

 but I may not be able to tell you many.

 Come now, you too try to fulfill your promise

 to me and tell me the nature of virtue

 as a whole

 and stop making many out of one,

 as jokers say whenever someone breaks something;

 but allow b virtue to remain

 whole and sound, 

and tell me what it is,

 for I have given you examples.

 MENO:

 I think, Socrates, that virtue is, 

as the poet says,

 "to find joy in beautiful things and have power." 

So I say that virtue

 is to desire beautiful things

 and have the power

 to acquire them. 

SOCRATES: 

Do you mean

 that the man who

 desires beautiful things

 desires good things? 

- Most certainly. 

SOCRATES:

 Do you assume 

that there are people

 who desire bad c things,

 and others 

who desire good things?

 Do you not think, my good man, 

that all men desire good things? 

MENO: 

I do not.

 SOCRATES: 

But some desire bad things? 

- Yes.

 SOCRATES: 

Do you mean

 that they believe

 the bad things 

to be good,

 or that

 they know 

they are 

bad and nevertheless

 desire them?

 - I think there are both kinds.

 SOCRATES: 

Do you think, Meno,

 that anyone, knowing

 that bad things are bad, 

nevertheless desires them?

 - I certainly do. 

SOCRATES: 

What do you mean by desiring? 

Is it to secure for oneself? 

- What else?

 SOCRATES: 

Does he think

 that the bad

 things benefit him

 who pos- d sesses them,

 or does he know

 they harm him?

 MENO: 

There are some who believe

 that the bad things benefit them,

 others who know

 that 

the bad 

 things harm them.

 SOCRATES:

 

 And do you think

 that those who believe

 that bad things benefit

 them know that they are bad? 

MENO: 

No, that I cannot altogether believe. 

SOCRATES: 

It is clear

 then that those

 who do not know

 things

 to be bad do not desire

 what is bad,

 but they desire

 those things that

 they e believe

 to be good

 but that are in fact bad.

 It follows that

 those who have

 no knowledge

 of these things

 and believe

 them to be good

 clearly desire

 good things. Is that not so?

 - It is likely. 

SOCRATES: 

Well then, 

those who you say

 desire bad things,

 believing that

 bad things harm their possessor,

 know that

 they will be harmed by them?

 - Necessarily. 

SOCRATES:

 And

 do they

 not think

 that those

 who are harmed

 are 78 miserable 

to the extent that they are harmed? 

- That too is inevitable.

 SOCRATES: 

And that those who are miserable are unhappy? 

- I think so.

 SOCRATES: 

Does anyone wish to be miserable and unhappy? 

- do not think so, Socrates. 

SOCRATES: 

No one

 then wants

 what is bad, Meno, 

unless

 he wants to be such.

 For 

what else is being

 miserable

 but to desire bad things

 and secure them?

 MENO: 

You are probably right, Socrates,

 and no one

 wants what b is bad.

 SOCRATES: 

Were you not saying

 just now

 that virtue

 is to desire good things

 and have the power to secure them? 

- Yes, I was. 

...:...

SOCRATES: 

Answer me again then from the beginning: 

What do you and your friend say that virtue is? 

MENO: 

Socrates, before I even met you

 I used to hear that you

 are always in a state of perplexity

 and that you

 bring others

 to the same

state,

 and now I think

 you are bewitching

 and beguiling me,

 simply putting me

 under a spell,

 so that I 

am quite perplexed.

 Indeed, if a joke is in order,

 you seem, in appearance and in every other way,

 to be like the broad torpedo fish,

 for it too makes anyone

 who comes close

 and touches it

 feel numb, 

and you now seem

 to have had that kind of effect

 on me,

 for both my

 mind and my

 tongue are numb,

 and I

 have no answer to give you

 Yet I 

have made many speeches

 about virtue before

 large audiences

 on a thousand occasions,

 very good speeches

 as I

 thought, but now I

 cannot even say what it is. I

 think you are wise

 not to sail away from Athens

 to go and stay elsewhere,

 for if you

 were to behave like this

 as a stranger

 in another city,

 you

 would be driven

 away for practicing sorcery.

 SOCRATES:

 You are a rascal, Meno, and you nearly deceived me. 

MENO: 

Why so particularly, Socrates? 

SOCRATES:

 I know why you drew this image of me.

 MENO: 

Why do you think I did? 

SOCRATES: 

So that I

 should draw

 an image

 of you

 in return.

 I know that

 all handsome men rejoice

 in images of themselves;

 it is to their advantage,

 for I

 think that

 the images of beautiful people 

are also beautiful,

 but I

 will draw

 no image of you in turn.

 Now

 if the torpedo fish is itself numb

 and so makes others numb,

 then I resemble it,

 but not otherwise,

 for I myself 

do not have the answer

 when I perplex others,

 but I am more perplexed

 than anyone

 when I cause perplexity

 in others. 

So now

 I do not know

 what virtue is;

 perhaps you knew

 before you contacted me,

 but now

 you are certainly 

like one who does not know.

 Nevertheless,

 I want to

 examine and seek together

 with you

 what it may be. 

MENO: 

How will you look for it, Socrates,

 when you do not know

 at all 

what it is? 

How will you aim to search for something you do not know at all?

 If you should meet with it,

 how will you know

 that this is the thing

 that you

 did not know? 

SOCRATES: 

I know what you

 want to say, Meno.

 Do you realize

 what a debater's argumen you are bringing up,

 that a man cannot search

 either for what he knows

 or for what he does not know? 

He cannot search for what he knows

 - since he knows it,

 there is no need to search

-nor for what he does not know, 

for he does not know

 what to look for.

 MENO:

 Does that argument not seem sound to you, Socrates? 

SOCRATES: 

Not to me. 

MENO: 

Can you tell me why? 

SOCRATES:

 I can. 

I have heard wise men and women talk about divine matters ... 

MENO: 

What did they say? 

SOCRATES: 

What was, I thought, 

both true and beautiful. 

MENO: 

What was it, 

and who were they? 

SOCRATES: 

The speakers

 were among the priests and priestesses

 whose care it is

 to be able to give an account

 of their practices.

 Pindar too says it,

 and many others of the divine among our poets.

 What they

 say is this;

 see whether you think they

 speak the truth:

 

They_ say that

 the human soul is immortal;

 at times it comes to an end,

 which they call dying; 

at times it is reborn,

 but it is never destroyed, 

and one must therefore

 live one's life 

as piously as possible:

 

Persephone will return

 to the sun above

 in the ninth year

 the souls of those

 from whom

 she will exact punishment

 for old miseries,

 and from these come noble kings, 

mighty in strength and greatest in wisdom,

 4 and for the rest of time

 men will call them sacred heroes. 

As the soul is immortal,

 has been born often,

 and has seen all things

 here and in the underworld, 

there is nothing 

which it has not learned; 

so it is in no way

 surprising that it can recollect

 the things it kne"." 

before, 

both about virtue and other things.

 As the whole of nature is akin

 and the soul has learned everything,

 nothing prevents a man,

 after recaliing one thing

 only-a process men call learni?g

-discovering everything 

else for himself, 

if he is brave and does not hr_e

 of the search, 

for searching and learning are,

 as a whole, recollection.

 We must, therefore, 

not believe that

 debater's argument,

 for it would 

make us idle 

and fainthearted men

 like to hear it,

 whereas 

my argument makes

 the~ energetic

 and keen on the search.

 I trust that. 

this is true, and I 

want to inquire along with you

 into the nature of vutue. 

MENO: 

Yes, Socrates, but how do you mean

 that we do not learn,

 but that what we call learning

 is recollection? 

Can you teach me that this is so? 

SOCRATES: 

As I said just now, Meno, you are a rascal. 

You now ask me if I can teach you,

 when I say there is no teaching but recollection, 

in order to show me

 up at once as contradicting myself.

 MENO: 

No, by Zeus, Socrates, 

that was not my intention when I spoke,

 but just a habit. 

If you can somehow show me

 that things are as you

 say, please do so.

 SOCRATES: 

It is not easy, but I am nevertheless willing

 to do my best for your sake. 

Call one of these many attendants of yours,

 whichever you like,

 that I may prove it to you

 in his case. 

MENO: 

Certainly. You there come forward.

 SOCRATES: 

Is he a Greek? Does he speak Greek? 

MENO: 

Very much so. 

He was born in our household. 

SOCRATES: 

Pay attention then whether you

 think he is recollecting or learning

 from me. 

MENO: 

I will pay attention.

 SOCRATES: 

Tell me now, boy, you know

 that a square figure is like this?

 - I do. 

SOCRATES: 

A square then is a figure

 in which all these four sides are equal?

 

- Yes indeed. 

SOCRATES: 

And it also has these lines

 through the middle equal?5

 -Yes. ? 5. 

Socrates draws a square ABCD. 

The "lines through the middle" 

are the lines joining the middle of these sides, 

which also go through the center

 of the square, namely EF and CH.