ΨοντινθΣΔ

SOCRATES: 

If I were directing you, Meno, and not only myself, 

we would not investigate 

whether virtue is teachable

 or not

 before we investigated

 what virtue itself is.

 But because you do not even attempt to rule yourself,

 in order that you may be free,

 but you try to rule me and do so,

 I will agree with you-for what can I do?

 So we must, it appears, 

inquire into the qualities of something

 the nature of which e we do not yet know.

 However, please relax your rule a little bit for me

 and agree to investigate whether it is teachable

 or not

 by means of a hypothesis. 

I mean the way geometers

 often carry on their investigations. 

For example, if they are asked whether

 a specific area 

can be inscribed 87

 in the form of a triangle

 within a given circle, 

one of them might say: 

"I do not yet know whether that area has that property, 

but I think I have, as it were, 

a hypothesis that is of use for the problem,

 namely this:

 If that area

 is such that when

 one

 has applied it

 as a rectangle

 to the given straight line

 in the circle, 

it is deficient

 by a figure

 similar b to the very figure

 which is applied,

 then I think one

 alternative results, 

whereas another results

 if it is impossible

 for this

  to happen. 

So, by using this hypothesis, 

I am willing to tell you

 what results

 with regard to inscribing it in the circle-that is,

 whether it is impossible or not."

14 

So let us speak about virtue also, 

since we do not know either

 what it is

 or what qualities

 it possesses,

 and let us investigate whether

 it is teachable

 or not by means

 of a hypothesis, 

and say this:

 Among the things existing in the soul, 

of what sort

 is virtue, 

that it should be

 teachable

 or not? 

First, 

if it is another sort

 than knowledge,

 is it teachable

 or not, 

or, as we were just saying, recollectable?

 Let it make no difference c

 to us which term we use: 

Is it teachable?

 Or is it plain

 to anyone

 that men

 cannot be taught

 anything but knowledge? 

- I think so. 

SOCRATES: 

But, if virtue

 is a kind· of 

knowledge, it is clear 

that it could be taught.

 - Of course. 

SOCRATES: 

We have dealt with that question quickly,

 that if it is of one kind

 it can be taught; 

if it is of a different kind, 

it cannot.

 - We have indeed. 

SocRATES: 

The next point to consider 

seems to be whether virtue is knowledge or something else. 

- That does seem to be the next point d to consider. 

14. The translation here follows the interpretation of T. L. Heath, A History of Greek Mathematics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921), vol. I, pp. 298 ff.

SOCRATES: 

Furthermore, 

those other things we were mentioning

 just now,

 wealth and the like, 

are at times good and at times harmful. 

Just as for the rest of the soul

 the direction of wisdom makes things beneficial, 

but harmful if directed by folly, 

so in these cases, 

if the soul uses and directs them right

 it makes them beneficial, 

but αψθτε/οβτθσε use makes them harmful?

 - Quite so. 

SOCRATES: 

The wise soul directs them right, the foolish soul wrongly?

 - That is so. 

SOCRATES: 

So one may say this about everything; 

all 

other human

 activities

 depend on the soul, 

and those of the soul

 itself depend on wisdom

 if they are

 to be

 good. 

According to this argument

 the beneficial would be wisdom, 

and we say that virtue

 is beneficial? 

- Certainly. 

SOCRATES: 

Then we say that virtue is wisdom, either the whole or a part of it? 

MENO: 

What you say, Socrates, seems to me quite right. 

SOCRATES: 

Then, if that is so,

 the good are not so by nature?

 - I do not think they are. 

SOCRATES:

 For if they were, this would follow:

 If the good were so by nature, 

by now...we would have people

 who knew which among the young were

 by nature good; 

we would take those whom they

 had pointed out and guard them

 in the Acropolis, sealing them up there

 much more carefully than gold so that no one could corrupt them,

 and when they reached maturity they would be useful to their cities.

 - Reasonable enough, Socrates. 

SOCRATES: Since the good are not good by nature, does learning make them so? 

MENO:

 Necessarily,

 as I now think, Socrates, and clearly,

 on our hypothesis,

 if virtue is knowledge, 

it can be taught.

 SOCRATES: 

Perhaps, by Zeus, 

but may it be that we were

 not right to agree to this?

 MENO: 

Yet it seemed to be right at the time.

 SOCRATES: 

We should not only think it right

 at the time, but also now

 and in the future

 if it

 is to be

 at all sound. 

MENO: 

What is the difficulty? 

What do you have in mind

 that you do not like about it

 and doubt that virtue is knowledge? 

...:...

During all that time to this very day his reputation has stood high; 

and not only Protagoras 

but a great

 92

 many others, some born before him and some still alive today. 

Are we to say that you maintain that they deceive and harm the young knowingly,

 or that they themselves are not aware of it? 

Are we to deem those whom

 some people consider the wisest

 of men to be so mad as that? 

ANITUS:

 They are far from being mad, Socrates. 

It is much rather those among the young

 who pay their fees who are mad, 

and even b more the relatives who entrust their young

 to them and most of all the cities

 who allow them to come in

 and do not drive out any citizen

 or stranger who attempts to

 behave in this manner. 

SOCRATES:

 Has some sophist wronged you, 

Anytus, or why are you

 so hard on them? 

ANYTus: 

No, by Zeus, I have never met one of them, 

nor would I allow any one of my people to do so. 

SOCRATES:

 Are you then altogether without any experience of these men? 

ANYTUS: 

And may I remain so. c

 SOCRATES: 

How then, my good sir, can you know

 whether there is any good in their instruction

 or not,

 if you are altogether

 without experience

 of it? 

ANY Two of us:

 Easily, for I know

 who they are, 

whether

 I have experience of them

 or not. 

SOCRATES:

 Perhaps you are a wizard, 

Anytus,

 for I wonder, from what you yourself say, 

how else you know about these things. 

However, d let us 

not try to find out 

who the men are whose company. 

would make 

Men or women

wicked

-let them be the sophists if you like-

but tell us, 

and benefit your family friend here by telling him, 

to whom he should go in so large a city to acquire, 

to any worthwhile degree, 

the virtue

 I was just now describing. 

ANYTus: 

Why did you not tell him yourself? 

SOCRATES: 

I did mention those whom I 

thought to be teachers of e it, 

but you say I

 am wrong, and perhaps you

 are right. 

You tell him in

 

your turn to whom

 among the Athenians he should go.

 Tell him the name of anyone you want.

 ANYTUS: 

Why give him the name of one individual? 

Any Athenian gentleman he may meet,

 if he is willing to be persuaded, 

will make him a better man

 than the sophists would. 

SOCRATES:

 And have these gentlemen become

 virtuous automatically, 

without learning from anyone, 

and are they able to teach 

others what they

 themselves

 never learned? 

ANYTUS: 

I believe 

that these men have learned

 from those who were gentlemen before them;

 or do you 

not think that there

are many

 good men

 in this 

  city

  ? 

SOCRATES: 

I believe, Anytus, that there are many men here who are good at public affairs, and that there have been as many in the past, 

but have they been good teachers of their own virtue?

 That is the point we are discussing, 

not whether there are good men here or not,

 or whether there have been in the past,

 but we have been investigating for some time

and remember what time it is my dear

 whether virtue can be taught. 

And in the course of that investigation

 we are inquiring

 whether the good men of today

 and of the past

 knew how to pass

 on to another

 the virtue

 they themselves

 possessed, 

or

 whether a man cannot

 pass it on or receive it from another. 

This is what Meno and I have been investigating for some time. 

Look at it this way, from what you yourself have said. 

Would you not say that Themistocles 16

 was a good man? 

- Yes. Even the best of men. 

SOCRATES:

 And therefore a good teacher of his own virtue if anyone was? 

ANY Two of us: 

I think so, if he wanted to be. 

SOCRATES: 

But do you think he did not want some other people to be worthy men, and especially his own son? Or do you think he begrudged him this, and deliberately did not pass on to him his own virtue? 

Have you not heard that 

Themistocles taught his son 

Cleophantus 

to be a good horseman?

 He could remain standing upright on horseback 

and shoot javelins from that position

 and do many other remarkable things 

which his father had him taught 

and made skillful at, 

all of which required

 good teachers. 

Have you not heard this from your elders? 

- I have. 

16. Famous Athenian statesman and general of the early fifth century B.C., a leader in the victorious war against the Persians.

SOCRATES: 

So one could not blame the poor natural talents of the son for his failure in virtue? 

- Perhaps not. 

SOCRATES: 

But have you ever heard anyone,

 young or old, say that Cleophantus,

 the son of Themistocles,

 was a good and wise man

 at the same pursuits as his father?

 - Never. 

SOCRATES: 

Are we to believe that he wanted to educate

 his son in those other things but not to do better

 than his neighbors in that skill which he himself possessed,

 if indeed virtue can be taught?

 - Perhaps not, by Zeus. 

SOCRATES: 

And yet he was, as you yourself agree, 

among

 the best teachers of virtue

 in the past.

 

Let us consider another man, Aristides, the son of Lysimachus.

 Do you not agree that he was good?

 - I very definitely do. 

SOCRATES:

 He too gave his own son Lysimachus the best Athenian education in matters which are the business of teachers, and do you think he made him a better man than anyone else? 

For you have been in his company and seen the kind of man he is.

 Or take Pericles, a man of such magnificent wisdom. 

You know that he brought up two sons, Paralus and Xanthippus?

 - I know. 

SOCRATES: 

You also know that he taught them to be as good horsemen as any Athenian, that he educated them in the arts, in gymnastics; and in all else that was a matter of skill not to be inferior to anyone, but did he not want to make them good men? I think he did, but this could not be taught. And lest you think that only a few most inferior Athenians are incapable in this respect, 

reflect that Thucydides 17

 too brought up two sons, Melesias and Stephanus, that he educated them well in all other things. They were the best wrestlers in Athens-he entrusted the one to Xanthias and the other to Eudorus, who were thought to be the best wrestlers of the day, or do you not remember? 

ANYrus: 

I remember I have heard that said. 

SOCRATES:

 It is surely clear that he would not have taught his boys what it costs money to teach, but have failed to teach them what costs nothing-making them good men-if that could be taught? Or was Thucydides perhaps an inferior person who had not many friends among the Athenians and the allies? He belonged to a great house; he had 

17. Not the historian but Thucydides the son of Melesias, an Athenian statesman who was an opponent of Pericles and who was ostracized in 440 B.C.

great influence in the city and among the other Greeks, 

so that if virtue could be taught he would have found the man

 who could make his sons good men, be it a citizen or a stranger, 

if he himself did not have the time because of his public concerns.

 But, friend Anytus, virtue can certainly not be taught.

 ANYrus: 

I think, Socrates, that you easily speak ill of people. I would advise you,

 if you will listen to me, to be careful.

 Perhaps also in another city, and certainly here, 

it is easier to injure people than to benefit them.

 I think you know that yourself. 

SocRATES: 

I think, Meno, that Anytus is angry, and I am not at all surprised. He thinks, to begin with, that I am slandering those men, and then he believes himself to be one of them. If he ever realizes what slander is, he will cease from anger, but he does not know it now. You tell me, are there not worthy men among your people? 

- Certainly. 

SocRATES: 

Well now, are they willing to offer themselves to the young as teachers? Do they agree they are teachers, and that virtue can be taught? 

MENO: 

No, by Zeus, Socrates, but sometimes you would hear them say that it can be taught, at other times, that it cannot. 

SOCRATES: 

Should we say that they are teachers of this subject, when they do not even agree on this point? - I do not think so, Socrates. 

SOCRATES: 

Further, do you think that these sophists, who alone profess to be so, are teachers of virtue? 

MENO:

 I admire this most in Gorgias, Socrates, that you would never hear him promising this. Indeed, he ridicules the others when he hears them making this claim. He thinks one should make people clever speakers. 

SOCRATES: 

You do not thinkthen that the sophists are teachers? 

MENO:

 I cannot tell, Socrates; like most people, at times I think they are; at other times I think that they are not. 

SocRATES: 

Do you know that not only you and the other public men

 at times think that it can be taught,

 at other times that it cannot,

 but that the poet Theognis 18

 says the same thing?

 - Where? 

SOCRATES: 

In his elegiacs: 

"Eat and drink with these men, 

and keep their company. 

Please those whose power is great, for you will learn

 goodness from the good.

 If you mingle with bad men 

you will lose even what wit you possess." 

You see that here 

he speaks as if virtue can be taught?

 - So it appears. 

8. Theognis was a poet of the mid-sixth century B.C. The quotations below are of lines 33-36 and 434-38 (Diehl) of his elegies. 

SOCRATES: 

Elsewhere, he changes somewhat:

 "If this could be done," he says,

 "and intelligence could be instilled," 

somehow those who could do this

 "would collect large and numerous fees,"

 and further:

 "Never would a bad son be born of a good father,

 for he would be persuaded by wise words,

 but you will never make a bad man good by teaching." 

You realize that the poet is contradicting

 himself

 on the same subject?

 - He seems to be. 

SOCRATES: 

Can you mention any other subject of which those 

.who claim to be teachers not only are not recognized

 to be teachers of others but are not recognized

 to have knowledge of it themselves, and are thought

 to be poor in the very matter which they profess to teach?

 Or any other subject of which those who are recognized

 as worthy teachers at one time say it can be taught

 and at other times that it cannot?

 Would you say that people who are so confused

 about a subject can be effective

 teachers of it?

 - No, by Zeus, I would not.

 SOCRATES: 

If then neither the sophists

 nor the worthy people

 themselves are teachers

 of this

 subject, 

clearly there would be

 no others? 

- I do not think there are. 

SOCRATES: 

If there are no teachers,

 neither are there 

 pupils? 

~ As you say. 

SOCRATES: 

And we agreed that a subject that has neither teachers nor pupils is not teachable? 

- We have so agreed. 

SOCRATES: 

Now there seem to be no teachers of virtue anywhere? 

- That is so. 

SOCRATES: 

If there are no teachers, there are no learners? 

- That seems so. 

SOCRATES: 

Then virtue cannot be taught?

 MENO: 

Apparently not,

 if we have investigated this correctly. 

I certainly wonder, Socrates, 

whether there are no good men either, 

or in what way good men come to be. 

SOCRATES: 

We are probably poor specimens, 

you and I, Meno. Gorgias has not adequately educated you, 

nor Prodicus me. 

We must then at all costs turn our attention

 to ourselves and find someone who will

 in some way make us better.

 I say this in view of 011r recent investigation, 

for it is ridiculous that we faileq to see that it is not only

under the direction ofknowledge that men succeed in their affairs, and that is perhaps why the knowledge of how good men come to be escapes us. MENO: How do you mean, Socrates? SOCRATES: I mean this: We were right to agree that good men must be beneficent, and that this could not be otherwise. Is that not so? - Yes. SOCRATES: And that they will be beneficent if they give us correct direction in our affairs. To this too we were right to agree? - Yes. SOCRATES: But that one cannot give correct direction if one does not have knowledge; to this our agreement is likely to be incorrect. - How do you mean? SOCRATES: I will tell you. A man who knew the way to Larissa, or anywhere else you like, and went there and directed others would surely lead them well and correctly? 

- Certainly.

 SOCRATES: 

What if someone had had a correct opinion as to which was the way but had not gone there nor indeed had knowledge of it, would he not also lead correctly?

 - Certainly. 

SOCRATES: 

And as long as he has the right opinion

 about that of which the other has knowledge,

 he will not be a worse guide

 than the one who knows,

 as he has a true opinion, 

though not knowledge.

 - In no way worse. 

SOCRATES:

 So true opinion is in no way a worse guide

 for correct action than knowledge.

 It is this that we omitted in our investigation

 of the nature of virtue, 

when we said that only knowledge

 can guide correct action, 

for true opinion

 can do so

 also. 

- So it seems. 

SOCRATES: 

So correct opinion is no less useful than knowledge? 

MENO: 

Yes, to this extent, Socrates. But the man who has knowledge will always succeed, whereas he who has true opinion will only succeed at times. 

SOCRATES: 

How do you mean? Will he who has the right opinion not always succeed, as long as his opinion is right?

 MENO:

 That appears to be so of necessity, and it makes me wonder, Socrates, 

this being the case, why knowledge is prized

 far more highly than right

 opinion, and why they are

 different. 

SOCRATES:

 Do you know why you wonder, or shall I tell you? 

- By all means tell me. 

SOCRATES: 

It is because you have

 paid no attention to the statues of Daedalus,

 but perhaps there are none in Thessaly. 

The most familiar literary telling explaining Daedalus' wings is a late one by Ovid in his Metamorphoses.^[36]

Daedalus and Icarus, c. 1645, by Charles Le Brun (1619–1690)

After Theseus and Ariadne eloped together,^[37] Daedalus and his son Icarus were imprisoned by King Minos in the labyrinth that he had built.^[38] He could not leave Crete by sea, as King Minos kept a strict watch on all vessels, permitting none to sail without being carefully searched. Since Minos controlled the land routes as well, Daedalus set to work to make wings for himself and his son Icarus. Using bird feathers of various sizes, thread, and beeswax, he shaped them to resemble a bird's wings. When both were prepared for flight, Daedalus warned Icarus not to fly too high, because the heat of the sun would melt the beeswax (holding his feathers together) and the wings would break, nor too low, because the sea foam would soak the feathers and make them heavy and he would fall.^[39] After Daedalus and Icarus had passed Samos, Delos, and Lebynthos, Icarus disobeyed his father and began to soar upward toward the sun. He flew too close to the sun. Without any warning, the sun melted the wax that held the feathers together and they fell off. Icarus kept flapping his "wings". But he realized he had no feathers left and he was only flapping his featherless arms. The feathers (one by one) fell like snowflakes, and down, down, and down he went into the sea, where he sank to the bottom and drowned. Seeing Icarus' wings floating in the sea, Daedalus wept, cursed his art, and finding Icarus's dead body on an island shore, buried Icarus's body there. Then he named the island Icaria in the memory of his child.^[40] The southeast end of the Aegean Sea where Icarus fell into the water was also called "Mare Icarium" or the Icarian Sea.^[41]

The Lament for Icarus by H. J. Draper (1898)

In a twist of fate, a partridge, presumably the nephew Daedalus murdered, mocked Daedalus as he buried his son. The fall and death of Icarus is seemingly portrayed as punishment for Daedalus's murder of his nephew.^[42]

The word chthonic (/ˈθɒnɪk/), or chthonian, is derived from the Ancient Greek word χθών, "khthon", meaning earth or soil. It translates more directly from χθόνιος or "in, under, or beneath the earth" which can be differentiated from Γῆ, or "ge", which speaks to the living surface of land on the earth.^[1][2][3] In Greek, chthonic is a descriptive word for things relating to the underworld and can be used in the context of chthonic gods, chthonic rituals, chthonic cults, and more.^[4] This is as compared to the more commonly referred-to Olympic gods and their associated rites and cults. Olympic gods are understood to reference that which exists above the earth, particularly in the sky.^[5] Gods that are related to agriculture are also considered to have chthonic associations as planting and growing takes place in part under the earth.^[6]